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Abstract
Expert opinions are often biased. To test how such bias affects the propensity
to use opinions, we set up an experiment where subjects estimate the probability
of an event that depends on (i) the subject’s type, which is observable, and (ii)
the unobserved state of the world. Before making their estimate, one group of
subjects, the clients, observe the opinion (estimate) of another subject, the expert.
The expert has private information about the state, but he may be of a different
type than the clients, and therefore biased. Bias is observable and easily corrected.
In spite of this, we find that clients’ propensity to use expert opinions is decreasing
in the size of the expert’s bias. This aversion to use the opinions of biased experts
is not explained by computational concerns, ex-post expert informativeness or
reluctance to move away from the prior.
Keywords: Experiments; Probability Estimation; Biased Opinions; Naive Advice
JEL Codes: C91; D81; D82
∗I would like to thank Praveen Kujal and my adviser Antonio Cabrales for valuable advice. Further-
more, I have received useful comments from Gary Charness, Piero Gottardi, A´ngel Hernando-Veciana,
Diego Moreno, Axel Ockenfels, Andrew Schotter and Matthias Sutter, as well as seminar audiences at
Toulouse School of Economics BEE Seminar and the Alhambra Experimental Workshop in Granada.
†Department of Economics, European University Institute, Via delle Fontanelle 10, I-50014 San
Domenico, Italy. Telephone: +39 055 4685 698. E-mail : jesper.rudiger@eui.eu
1 Introduction
We often base our decisions on the opinions of other people, although we may consider
these opinions to be biased. Consider the following example. You are looking to buy
a particular car, and before making the decision, you want to estimate its maintenance
costs. These depend both on the quality of the car and how it is treated. As it turns out,
a friend of yours already owns exactly the same model. He tells you that in his opinion,
the car requires a great deal of maintenance. But you are aware that he, unlike you,
is not very careful with his car. So whereas your friend’s opinion contains information
about the quality of the car, you also need to adjust for his carelessness when you
estimate what your own maintenance costs would be. In this example, the friend is
better informed than you, but has no vested interest in the decision made. Thus, the
situation differs from the games of strategic information transmission that have been
extensively studied in experiments.1 Neither does it correspond to advice-giving, which
is typically investigated in a sequential setting where subjects pass on advice about
which actions to take.2 Rather, the friend in our example states an opinion about the
frequency with which his car breaks down, but you are interested in the frequency with
which your car would break down. The friend’s opinion is thus biased, in the sense that
it concerns a variable that is different – but correlated – to the variable of interest.
In the present paper we investigate the following question: how do we use biased
opinions in decision making? To this end we set up an experiment in which subjects
estimate the probability of drawing a black ball from a cage that contains only black
and white balls. Part of the cage is known and depends on the subject’s type (the car
owner’s carefulness in the above example). The other part is unknown and depends on
1For instance, communication increases payoffs in coordination games (Cooper et al., 1989, 1992;
Crawford, 1998; Blume and Ortmann, 2007). When subjects have partially aligned interests, there
is often excessive information revelation (Cai and Wang, 2006) and aversion to lying (Gneezy, 2005;
Sa´nchez-Page´s and Vorsatz, 2007; Hurkens and Kartik, 2009).
2In such intergenerational settings, advice is found to: increase coordination (Schotter and Sopher,
2003); facilitate backward induction in trust games (Schotter and Sopher, 2006); induce higher contri-
butions in public goods games (Chaudhuri et al., 2006); cause lower offers and higher rejection rates in
ultimatum games (Schotter and Sopher, 2007). Furthermore, observing advice seems to be better than
observing actions in fostering social learning (C¸elen and Kariv, 2010; Kocher et al., forthcoming).
1
the unobserved state (the car quality in the example). We can think of each subject as
having his own cage, which depends on his type, and all the cages are correlated through
the state. In stage 1 of the experiment, subjects observe a sample drawn from their own
cage, and make an estimate. We refer to this estimate as the opinion. In stage 2, there
is no sample. Instead, a subject (the client) observes the opinion of a subject from stage
1 (the expert) who was in the same state and observed a sample. The client and the
expert may be of different types (this is the bias). This is fully observable. Hence, the
expert’s opinion is relevant to the client, since they are in the same state and the expert
has private information in form of the sample. But the opinion is potentially biased
since the expert might be of a different type. However, as this is observable, the bias
can be corrected. The subjects are scored using a quadratic rule and payoffs depend
only on the their own estimate, which eliminates any strategic incentives.
Our approach is most similar to Nyarko et al. (2006), who set up an investment
game in which subjects must estimate the probability that an investment is profitable,
and choose whether to invest. The authors create a set of experimental experts by
having a group of subjects play the game first, and then elicit their beliefs and a piece
of investment advice. This information is auctioned off to a new set of subjects who
observe a set of personal characteristics of the expert (college major, gender, etc.), and
the relation between the auction price and the expert characteristics is investigated. In
our paper, on the other hand, experts have an exogenous bias, and we analyze how this
bias affects clients’ propensity to use expert opinions.
First, we investigate the usefulness of expert opinions. Opinions are found to un-
derweight sample information and to be slanted toward the midpoint which gives equal
probability to both events (Result 1). Underweighting of sample information is a well-
known experimental phenomenon,3 whereas slant toward the midpoint is most likely
caused by risk-aversion. The consequence of this and general noisy updating by experts
is that opinions have lower average score than the Bayesian prior.4 However, opinions
3Although representativeness – overweighting of sample information – is normally more prevalent,
both types of updating co-exist, and the propensity to use one or the other is context-specific (Grether,
1980; El-Gamal and Grether, 1995; Nyarko et al., 2006).
4By the score of the opinion and the prior, we refer to the score that a subject would obtain by
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still contain significant information about the state. Next we investigate how clients
use expert opinions. As it turns out, clients do incorporate expert opinions into their
estimates, but evidence suggests that they are more likely to use the prior than to use
the opinion (Result 2). The clients’ average score is the same as that of the expert
opinion, which is lower than the average score of the prior.
Second, we turn to the main question: does the propensity to use the opinion depend
on the bias? In our setting, bias is exogenous and easily corrected for, and therefore
should not affect clients’ estimates. However, we find that the propensity to use opinions
is decreasing in the size of the bias (Result 3). This finding is robust to the inclusion
of controls such as computational costs,5 failure to adjust for bias, aversion to make
estimates that are different to the prior and heterogeneous informativeness of experts.
Thus, our results are indicative of a type of bias aversion among clients: even though bias
is observable and can be adjusted such that all experts are a priori equally informative,
clients prefer less biased experts.6
Third, we investigate how the aforementioned control variables affect the propensity
to use opinions and the clients’ score. We show that the propensity to use opinions
decreases the farther the opinion is from the prior, but is unaffected by ex-post expert
informativeness and computational costs (Result 4). The first effect captures client
aversion to changing beliefs, whereas the third effect suggests that clients are not very
good at deducing the expert’s ability. The clients’ score is unaffected by bias size, as
well computational costs and distance between opinion and prior (Result 5).
2 Experimental Design
Subjects were recruited from the undergraduate population at Universidad Carlos III
de Madrid. They spent between 1/2 and 1 1/2 hours to complete the tasks, but were
setting his estimate equal to either of these.
5We test for computational costs by including a dummy that identifies bias/no bias.
6This has a very similar flavor to homophily, whereby clients choose experts that have personal
characteristics similar to themselves (Nyarko et al., 2006). To the extent that lack of bias invokes
feelings of similarity, the result can be related to studies which show that affect leads to more updating
mistakes (Charness and Levin, 2005; Charness et al., 2007).
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Figure 1 – Example with Type = 3. The left cage (State = 4) occurs with probability pi,
the right cage (State = 0) with probability 1− pi.
not allowed to leave the experiment for the first 45 minutes. Average earnings were
e 12, including a e 4 show-up fee. All experiments were computerized using common
interactive instructions.7 Four sessions were run in November and December of 2010,
with a total of 66 subjects.
Subject Task. The experiment is constructed as a probability estimation game.
Each subject must estimate the probability of drawing a black ball from a cage of 10
balls which are either black or white.8 The first 6 balls are of known color, and these
represent the type of the subject. Let Type ∈ {0, ..., 6} denote how many of the 6
balls are black. The remaining 4 balls are not observed, and are either all black or
all white. We denote by State ∈ {0, 4} the number of these balls that are black. Let
P(State = 4) = pi and P(State = 0) = 1 − pi, with pi ∈ {1
2
, 1
3
}. Type and pi change
throughout the experiment, but are always known to subjects. Thus, they can calculate
the prior as Prior = (ClientType+ 4pi)/10.
The total number of black balls in the cage is hence Type + State, and the true
probability of drawing a black ball is (Type+ State)/10. Figure 1 illustrates the setup
for the case where Type = 3. In this case the total number of black balls is either 3 or
7. Conditional on this information, the expected number of black balls is 7pi+ 3(1− pi).
Information. The experiment has two stages, and the subject’s information de-
pends on the stage. In stage 1, subjects observe a sample consisting of 3 balls drawn with
7The software used for the experiment was z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). The instructions are available
online at the author’s website.
8In the experiment, balls were either white or red, but for expositional purposes we use black here.
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replacement from the cage, and make an estimate. Denote this by Sample ∈ {0, ..., 3}.
In stage 2, we refer to the subjects as clients. Clients do not observe a sample, but
instead observe the stage 1 estimate of another subject – the expert – who did the
experiment at a previous date, and was in the same state. The expert has better in-
formation, since he observed a sample, but he may have a different type: ExpertType
6= ClientType. This is observed by clients. Thus, the expert’s estimate is potentially
biased in the view of the client, and therefore we refer to it as BiasedOpinion.
Since the client knows both his own type and that of the expert, he can calculate
expert bias as Bias = (ExpertType − ClientType)/10. We refer to the bias-adjusted
opinion as the Opinion for short, and calculate it as Opinion = BiasedOpinion−Bias.
The expert changes in each period and hence, clients cannot learn about the expert. This
is made clear in the instructions. Thus, Opinion would be the client’s best estimate if
all subjects were risk-neutral Bayesian updaters.
Let us recap the main features of the experiment. The expert’s estimate is relevant
to the client: both are in the same state, and the expert has private information. But
if the expert and the client are of different types, they face different probabilities of
drawing a black ball, even if they are in the same state. Therefore, from the point of
view of the client, the expert’s opinion is biased. Notice also that whereas the prior
is straightforward to calculate, the posterior is more complicated. However, it is easy
for subjects to come up with rules of thumb. For instance, letting SampleProp be the
proportion of black balls in the sample, a good estimate is .8×Prior+.2×SampleProp.9
Table 1 summarizes the stages.
Table 1 – Stages
Stage 1 Stage 2
Sample Yes No
Expert Opinion No Yes
Periods 20 30
9Actually, subjects who followed this rule would have scored higher (see scoring rule below) than
Bayesian updaters.
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Timing and Payoffs. The timing of the experiment is as follows. In each period
of stage 1, subjects observe their type, their sample, and make an estimate. In each
period of stage 2, clients observe their own type, the type of the expert, the expert’s
opinion, and then make an estimate.
Payoffs are calculated using a quadratic scoring rule, which elicits the true subjective
probability of a subject under risk neutrality.10 After each subject’s cage has been
determined by the subject’s type and the state, a ball is drawn randomly from the cage
by the computer. Let Outcome = 1 if the ball is black and Outcome = 0 if it is white.
Denote the subject’s estimate of the probability of drawing a black ball by Estimate.
The subject’s score is then
Score(Estimate) =
{
10000× (1− (1− Estimate)2) if Outcome = 1,
10000× (1− Estimate2) if Outcome = 0.
After the experiment, the score is converted at the rate of 5000 points to one Euro,
and subjects are paid for 5 randomly chosen rounds. Since subjects are paid only as a
function of their own estimate, experts have no strategic incentives.
3 The Informational Content of Opinions
In this section we investigate the informational content of opinions and the propensity
of clients to use them. Since the opinions are taken from stage 1 estimates, we first
look at these. Let Post denote the Bayesian posterior, conditional on the sample.11
Figure 2 maps the distribution of Estimate − Post in stage 1 and, as can be seen, it
is single-peaked, almost symmetric around zero, but with thinner tails than the normal
distribution. A t-test shows that the mean is not significantly different to zero (p-value =
.61).12 Next, we consider how estimates relate to the prior and the opinion. Subjects are
in general “conservative”, in the sense that they underweight the information contained
in the sample, and skew their estimates toward the prior as well as the midpoint (i.e.
10This rule is extensively used in experiments and dates back to Brier (1950).
11In particular, Post = ClientType10 +
4
10 · pi·P(Sample,State=4)pi·P(Sample,State=4)+(1−pi)·P(Sample,State=0) .
12All standard errors reported and used for tests are clustered around subjects.
6
Table 2 – Score
Stage 1 Stage 2
Mean Score(Estimate) 7,546 7,411
Mean Score(Prior) 7,723 7,599
Mean Score(Opinion) - 7,415
1/2).13 Since the midpoint gives constant payoff, we can see slanting toward it as an in-
dication that subjects are risk-averse. Conservative updating is a common phenomenon,
although it it is often found to be less prevalent than representativeness (overweighting
data) and approximate Bayesianism (Grether, 1980; El-Gamal and Grether, 1995). In
our setting, we speculate that conservatism is more prevalent due to the complexity of
the task. The opinions are taken from stage 1 and will therefore in general reflect these
patterns.
Table 2 breaks down the average score by stage, and compares it to how much
subjects would have scored if they had “blindly” followed either the prior or the opinion.
Notice that in stage 1 they score considerably lower than the prior. This may be due
in parts to risk-averse behavior. The pattern is repeated in stage 2: opinions give lower
average score than the prior, and a t-test says that this difference in mean scores is
significant (p-value <.001). However, this does not imply that opinions do not contain
information beyond the prior. Regressing the outcome on the prior and the opinion, we
find that both the coefficient of the prior and of the opinion are positive and significant.14
This leads us to our first result.
Result 1. Opinions underweight sample information, are slanted toward the midpoint
and yield lower mean score than priors. However, opinions still contain significant
information beyond that contained in the prior.
Since opinions carry significant information, a clever client might be able to combine
13Regression result: Estimate = .16(.04)Midpoint + .40(.05)Prior + .44(.04)Post. Standard errors
in parenthesis. Midpoint is a constant that takes the value 1/2. The positive coefficient on Prior and
the less-than-unit coefficient on Post indicate that sample information is being underweighted.
14Regression result: Outcome = .16(.04) + .47(.08)Prior + .20(.07)Opinion.
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Table 3 – Benchmarks
Prop. of estimates within 2 pts. of
Opinion .11
Prior .23
BiasedOpinion .05
Note: We include observations with no
overlap between the measures, i.e.
observations are not “double-counted”.
these pieces of information to obtain a better score. However, as Table 2 shows, on
average clients do about as well as the experts’ opinions, and they have significantly
lower average score than the prior.15 Furthermore, there does not seem to be a learning
effect: regressing score on period in stage 2 does not reveal a significant relationship.16
To shed further light on how priors and opinions are used by clients, Table 3 shows the
proportion of stage 2 client estimates that were within 2 points of the prior and the
opinion, respectively. Twice as many estimates were close to the prior as were close
to the opinion. Furthermore, regressing the estimate on the prior, the bias-adjusted
opinion and the unadjusted opinion in stage 2, we find that the coefficient on the prior
is significantly higher than the coefficient on the opinion.17 We summarize this in our
second result.
Result 2. Clients have higher propensity to follow the prior than to follow the opinion.
However, on average clients score the same as the opinion, and lower than the prior.
An interesting empirical corollary to this result is found in Pogrebna (2008), who
shows that game show contestants often do not follow the audience’s advice, even when
15According to a t-test, the mean score of clients and opinions are not significantly different (p-
value=.91), whereas the mean score of clients and priors are significantly different (p-value < .001).
16Regression result: Score = 7451.6(105.7)− 2.6(6.0)Period.
17Regression result: Estimate = .12(.04)Midpoint+ .56(.05)Prior + .09(.03)BiasedOpinion+
.27(.05)Opinion. A t-test reveals that the coefficient on Prior is significantly higher than both the
coefficient on Opinion (p-value =.002), the coefficient on BiasedOpinion (p-value<.001), and the sum
of the two (p-value=.02).
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this is in general quite informative. In our setting, there is a great deal of uncertainty
about the expert and the updating rule that he may have followed to arrive at his
opinion. This may explain why expert opinions are used rather cautiously by clients.
4 The Effect of Bias
In this section we analyze the effect of expert bias on the propensity of clients to use
expert opinions. Subsequently, we discuss alternative factors that might influence the
propensity to use opinions. Lastly, we look at whether expert bias affects client score.
4.1 Bias and Opinions
To measure the effect of bias on clients’ propensity to use opinions, we construct the
variable ∆ = Opinion−Prior and interact it with BiasSize. This interaction captures
how clients shift weight from the prior to the opinion as the bias size increases. If it is
negative, it implies that clients’ propensity to use opinions is decreasing in the size of
the bias.
To check the robustness of the effect of bias size, we test for a number of alternative
explanations of the propensity to use expert opinions. First, it is possible that bias
matters only due to computational concerns, such that clients place less weight on
opinions when the bias-adjustment is harder to compute. Since the bias-adjustment
always follows the same formula, there is only a computational difference between the
cases where the bias is zero, and those where it is non-zero. Thus, we construct the
variable Zero = I(BiasSize = 0), where I(·) is the identity function, and interact it
with ∆. This allows us to check whether clients react to bias/no bias rather than the
size of the bias. Second, clients may have a psychological bias in the sense that they are
reluctant to use opinions that are far away from the prior. To test for this, we interact ∆
with |∆|. Third, it is possible that the informativeness of the expert’s opinion depends
on his type.18 Therefore, we interact ∆ with ExpertType(k) = I(ExpertType = k).
18Suppose, for instance, that subjects believe that Opinion = 0 if ExpertType+ExpertSample < 5
and Opinion = 1 otherwise. If ExpertType < 2, the opinion is uninformative since Opinion = 0
always, but for ExpertType ≥ 2 some information is transmitted. Therefore, the expert type may
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Fourth, it is conceivable that the client perceives the ability of the expert through the
estimate (for instance, if the estimate is clearly not Bayesian), and adjusts for this.
Therefore we interact ScoreOpinion with ∆, to see if opinions that ex-post lead to a
higher score are more likely to be used. Finally, we allow for the possibility that subjects
forget to adjust for the bias, and use BiasedOpinion.
The regression equation is then
Estimate = β0Midpoint+ β1Prior + β2Opinion+ β3BiasedOpinion
+ ∆× [δBiasSize+ δ0Zero+ δD|∆|+ δSScoreOpinion]
+
∑
kγk∆ExpertType(k) + ,
(M1)
where  is a normally distributed error term. We are interested in the coefficient δ which
measures how the weight given to the opinion changes with the size of the bias.
We estimate M1 using all stage 2 observations and present the results in Table 4. The
coefficient δ is negative and significant, and thus the bias size is negatively correlated
with the weight placed on the opinion. To test the robustness of our approach, Appendix
A estimates two alternative models to test the influence of bias size on clients’ propensity
to use expert opinions. Both models confirm the above result on δ. We thus have the
following result.
Result 3. Bias size has a negative effect on clients’ propensity to use expert opinions.
The smaller the bias of the expert, the more likely it is that his opinion is used.
This finding has the same flavor as Nyarko et al. (2006), but their finding of homophily
was related to personal characteristics, whereas our types are exogenously assigned. We
have controlled for a number of alternative factors which could influence the weight
given to opinions versus priors, and none of them seem to take away the effect of bias
size. Our best explanation is that some clients are simply bias averse. Although they
realize that they can adjust for the bias (because they do so when the bias is small), they
are reluctant to do so when the bias is large. Furthermore, this effect is economically
significant: for each unit of bias, the coefficient on the opinion decreases by 0.1.19
influence the propensity to use opinions.
19Notice that the maximum value the coefficient on the opinion can take is .85, since it is decreasing
in all the interaction terms. Hence, a change of 0.1 constitutes more than 10% of the initial value.
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Table 4 – M1: Client Estimates
Estimate
Prior -.01 (.16)
Opinion .85∗∗∗ (.17)
∆× BiasSize -.10∗∗ (.03)
∆× Zero -.10 (.10)
∆× |∆| -.79∗∗ (.23)
∆× ScoreOpinion -.04a (.06)a
BiasedOpinion .08∗ (.03)
Midpoint .10∗ (.04)
TypeControls Yes
R2 .54
Observations 1980
Estimated by OLS. Standard errors in parentheses. ∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. Standard errors are
clustered around subjects.
a The coefficient and standard error have been multiplied by
10, 000.
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4.2 Other Determinants of the Propensity to Use Opinions
Above we consider three alternative hypotheses: the propensity to use opinions depends
on either the presence rather than the size of bias, on the distance of the opinion to the
prior, or on the ex-post score of the opinion. Of these hypotheses, only one has bite:
since δD is negative and significant (Table 4), clients have lower propensity to use expert
opinions the farther they are from the prior.20 On the other hand, δ0 is insignificant,
and hence clients do not simply pay attention to unbiased experts and discard the rest.
Similarly, δS is insignificant, implying that the propensity of clients to use opinions is
not correlated with the ex-post realized score of the opinion.
Result 4. Clients’ propensity to use expert opinions is decreasing in the distance between
the opinion and the prior. However, the propensity is unaffected by the score of the
opinion and is equal for experts with, respectively, no bias and strictly positive bias.
The lower propensity to use opinions that are farther from the prior may simply
express reluctance of the clients to move their estimate away from their prior. But we
can also speculate that clients use the distance of opinions to priors to derive information
about the expert, and feel less compelled to trust experts who have opinions that are very
different to the prior. However, if this is the explanation, the clients fail the objective:
as illustrated by the second part of the result, clients are very bad at picking high-
scoring experts. How could they do this? Since learning is disabled in the experiment,
the only manner in which clients can evaluate experts is by their opinion. These may
be informative about the expert in the following sense: if the estimate is outside the
interval in which the true probability lies (e.g. the interval [0.3, 0.7] in Figure 1), the
expert must be either risk-loving, of low ability or have misunderstood the exercise. This
should lower the client’s propensity to use the opinion (unless he is himself risk-loving).
Clients do not seem to have benefited from such considerations. Finally, the finding that
– conditional on other covariates – clients do not have higher propensity to use opinions
of unbiased experts, implies that we can rule out that clients are motivated by simple
computational concerns.
20We also run model M1 including |BiasedOpinion− Prior| ×∆ to check whether it is the distance
between the prior and the unadjusted opinion that matters, but find no effect.
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Table 5 – M2: Score and Bias Size
Score
BiasSize -57.6 (74.3)
Zero -105.1 (256.5)
|∆| -137.2 (481.3)
Constant 7623.7∗∗∗ (279.2)
TypeControls Yes
R2 0.05
Observations 1980
Estimated by OLS. Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. Standard errors are clustered
around subjects.
4.3 Bias and Score
We have shown above that clients react to expert bias, and also that clients are not very
good at picking high-ability experts. We now want to investigate whether there is an
interaction between the two: does bias size affect client score? As earlier, we control for
the expert type. The regression equation is then.
Score = β + δBiasSize+ δ0Zero+ δD|∆|+
5∑
k=0
γkExpertType(k) + , (M2)
where  is a normally distributed error term. δ captures the effect of bias size on score.
We estimate model M2 using all observations in stage 2 and present the results in
Table 5. The coefficient δ is not significant, and neither are δ0 or δD. We summarize
this in our final result.
Result 5. There is no effect of bias size on score. Furthermore, the score is unaffected by
the distance between the opinion and the prior and is equal for experts with, respectively,
no bias and strictly positive bias.
Thus, although clients react to bias by shifting away from the opinion toward the
prior, this has no effect on their score on average. In our case, this may be a consequence
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of the low informativeness of opinions, which implies that although giving less weight to
the opinion means ignoring the expert’s private information, it also means incorporating
less noise.
5 Conclusion
We have explored how opinions are used in a setting where clients must simultaneously
handle the fact that experts are biased and of unknown ability. In our setup, priors
are easy to compute but posteriors less so. However, experts can do very well by using
simple heuristics, and therefore their estimates should contain useful information. The
results shed light on how subjects react to bias in these situations. We have set up the
experiment to make the bias-adjustment easy, in order to make it as easy as possible for
clients to use expert opinions. Furthermore, we control for a range of factors which might
influence the clients’ propensity to use opinions. We find that clients have significantly
smaller propensity to use the expert opinion the greater the bias.
The results are indicative that bias matters, even when it should not. Whereas
homophily based on personal characteristics may represent a certain type of statistical
discrimination (or at least, a belief that this can be done), in our case no such explanation
is available. Neither does our setup invoke emotional responses in the subjects. Bias is
purely exogenous and refers simply to the composition of a cage.
The findings are relevant for the study of experts, and especially for situations where
bias is a choice variable (such as in the study of commercial news media). Clients prefer
“straight talk”, rather than having to extrapolate information by considering expert
bias. Thus, the choice of bias has an effect beyond the informativeness of the opinions
and the emotional responses they elicit.
14
A Alternative Models for Bias and Opinions
In this appendix we provide two alternative models that test how clients’ propensity to
use opinions are affected by bias size.
Alternative Model 1: Propensity to Use Opinions. As a first alternative
measure, we look at “behavior types” who use either the opinion or the prior (within two
percentage points) directly. Such behavior accounts for 34% of the total estimates (Table
3). We then construct the variables UseOpinion = I(|Estimate−Opinion| ≤ 0.02) and
UsePrior = I(|Estimate−Prior| ≤ 0.02), and analyze how the propensity to use priors
or opinions depends on the bias.
UseOpinion = δBiasSize+ δ0Zero+
5∑
k=0
γkExpertType(k) + , (A1)
where  is an error term, and the model is estimated by Probit. Again we are interested
in the coefficient δ which measures how bias size affects the propensity to use the opinion.
Table 6 – Alternative Model 1: Using the Benchmarks
UseOpinion UsePrior
BiasSize -0.20∗∗∗ (0.04) 0.22∗∗∗ (0.05)
Zero -0.21 (0.13) 0.73∗∗∗ (0.18)
Constant -0.31 (0.20) -1.36∗∗∗ (0.22)
TypeControls Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.030 0.073
Observations 1837 1837
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
Only includes stage 2 observations where UseOpinion 6= UsePrior.
Standard errors are clustered around subjects.
Table 6 presents the results of model A1, which confirm that bias size is negatively
and significantly correlated with client propensity to use the opinion. The table also
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shows that, conversely, bias size is positively correlated with the propensity to use the
prior. Model A1 thus corroborates Result 3.
Alternative Model 2: Direction of Estimates. As a second alternative mea-
sure, we look at the cases in which the prior and the opinion are on different half-
intervals, and analyze the propensity of clients to choose one half-interval or the other.
Let EstimateHigh = I(Estimate > 0.5), OpinionHigh = I(Opinion > 0.5) and
PriorHigh = I(Prior > 0.5). This measure is very robust, since the half-interval
of the client’s estimate should not depend on his risk attitude.21 The model is then
EstimateHigh = δOpinionHigh×BiasSize+ β0 + β1OpinionHigh+ , (A2)
where  is an error term. We estimate this by Probit, using only observations for which
the opinion and the prior are on different half-intervals: OpinionHigh+PriorHigh = 1.
In this way, δ captures the effect of the bias size on the propensity of the client’s estimates
to be on the half-interval of the opinion rather than that of the prior.
Table 7 – Alternative Model 2: Half-intervals
EstimateHigh
OpinionHigh 1.87∗∗∗ (0.54)
OpinionHigh× BiasSize -0.82∗∗∗ (0.25)
OpinionHigh × Zero -1.56∗∗ (0.55)
Constant -0.20 (0.16)
Pseudo R2 0.054
Observations 234
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗
p < 0.001. Only includes stage 2 observations where
OpinionHigh 6= PriorHigh. Standard errors are clustered
around subjects.
As revealed by Table 7, δ is negative and significant: the propensity of clients to
21However, it may depend on his beliefs about the expert’s risk attitude.
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choose the same half-interval as the expert’s opinion is decreasing in bias size. Hence,
Result 3 is confirmed by Model A2.
B Figures
Figure 2 – Deviation from Bayesian Posterior
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